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Abstract
Sense of Agency, the phenomenology associated with causing one’s own actions and corresponding effects, is a cornerstone of
human experience. Social Agency can be defined as the Sense of Agency experienced in any situation in which the effects of our
actions are related to a conspecific. This can be implemented as the other’s reactions being caused by our action, joint action
modulating our Sense of Agency, or the other’s mere social presence influencing our Sense of Agency. It is currently an open
question how such Social Agency can be conceptualized and how it relates to its nonsocial variant. This is because, compared
with nonsocial Sense of Agency, the concept of Social Agency has remained oversimplified and underresearched, with disparate
empirical paradigms yielding divergent results. Reviewing the empirical evidence and the commonalities and differences be-
tween different instantiations of Social Agency, we propose that Social Agency can be conceptualized as a continuum, in which
the degree of cooperation is the key dimension that determines our Sense of Agency, and how it relates to nonsocial Sense of
Agency. Taking this perspective, we review how the different factors that typically influence Sense of Agency affect Social
Agency, and in the process highlight outstanding empirical questions within the field. Finally, concepts fromwider research areas
are discussed in relation to the ecological validity of Social Agency paradigms, and we provide recommendations for future
methodology.
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Sense of Agency is the phenomenology associated with the
responsibility we feel over voluntary actions and their effects:
You click a hyperlink on a web page, and the new page opens.
If this takes too long, you will feel frustration, and once the
page opens, youmay feel less responsible for it happening. If a
pop-up advertisement window opens, you may feel little
Sense of Agency, or on the contrary be acutely aware that it
was you who clicked a dodgy link. Social Agency is Sense of
Agency when the voluntary action’s effect is the direct or
indirect reaction of a conspecific that we perceive as an inde-
pendent agent. Walking along a street, you smile towards a
friend you see, which causes them to return your smile in kind.
Consider also if instead of smiling at the oncoming person,
you smile at the dog walking beside them. This may still
indirectly make the other person smile, even though they are
not the target of your action.
Social Agency has vital importance to social development.
Humans are an intrinsically social species, and the majority of
our actions elicit social effects (Pfeiffer et al., 2014) alongside
environmental effects, irrespective of intention. From infancy,
humans are attuned to detect (Hains & Muir, 1996) and re-
spond to social cues (Michel, Wronski, Pauen, Daum, &
Hoehl, 2019), and we prefer prosocial responses from others
(Grynszpan, Martin, & Fossati, 2017). We also ubiquitously
engage in actions where social effects are the exclusive objec-
tive (Gobel, Tufft, & Richardson, 2018). This is key during
development, where social interactions transmit information
initially through dyadic interaction, and then through triadic
interaction with another agent towards a third object or person
(Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). This social transmis-
sion of information, or ‘social learning’ (Whiten, 2017), con-
tributes to the development of the Self. Social learning in
humans also has adaptive value by facilitating exponential
cultural growth, and introduces a degree of interdependence
not found in any other species (Mesoudi & Thornton, 2018).
Despite social interaction being crucial to the development
of social understanding (Schilbach et al., 2013; Whiten,
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2017), the empirical investigation of Social Agency is still
very much in its infancy, and its neurobiological exploration
almost nonexistent (but see Buchholz, David, Sengelmann, &
Engel, 2019; Dumas, Martinerie, Soussignan, & Nadel,
2012). In the extant literature, the term “Social Agency” is
loosely used to designate the Sense of Agency in quite distinct
situations, such as human–computer interactions, joint action
situations, or more diffuse social interactions, without neces-
sarily distinguishing how these situations differ. Here, we
bring together these different instantiations of Social Agency
and, based on the stark empirical differences in the nature of
Social Agency in such situations, propose a novel approach
that integrates social and nonsocial agency in one frame-
work. This framework will be based on the underlying
properties of the context in which the consequences of the
action occurs, on the characteristics of these consequences,
and on the beliefs held about the other agent by the person
executing the action.
This review first introduces Sense of Agency, and more
specifically, Social Agency as a core element of the human
experience. Following, we develop a comprehensive pic-
ture of the concept of Social Agency. Currently, the em-
pirical view of Social Agency is oversimplified as a uni-
form construct that applies to all forms of social situations
and as such, conflicting results are abundant in the litera-
ture. Using an evidence-based approach, this review will
instead argue that Social Agency must be viewed as a
continuum, where differing contextual and experimental
elements influence agency. Specifically, we propose that
the degree of cooperation between actors within a social
interaction is a key dimension which influences Sense of
Agency: The presence of cooperative elements within an
interaction enhances agency, whereas social interaction
with little to no cooperation diminishes agency.
Re-representing Social Agency as a continuum reconciles
existing empirical disparities and crucially highlights unex-
plored areas within Social Agency as well as unanswered
empirical questions brought up by the existing literature.
Addressing these gaps and discrepancies would enrich our
understanding of Social Agency. A fallout of our model is that
it suggests clear experimental approaches to resolve these is-
sues. The review will summarize the outstanding empirical
questions for Social Agency and give recommendations for
future research.
Sense of Agency and Social Agency
Sense of Agency is the experience of responsibility over
voluntary actions and their effects (Haggard, 2017;
Haggard & Chambon, 2012). A typical example is the
responsibility felt over a bulb lighting up when a switch
is pressed, or over a ball moving when it is kicked. Sense
of Agency is the construct by which we phenomenologi-
cally distinguish self-induced actions from actions due to
other causes (see Hoerl et al., 2020). If both you and
another reach to press the light switch at the same time,
what processes are used to determine who caused the bulb
to illuminate? Sense of Agency relies on either action
prediction or action–outcome comparison (Haggard &
Chambon, 2012). Action prediction induces Sense of
Agency when a predicted outcome matches the experi-
enced sensory feedback (Frith, 2012). Action–outcome
comparison is postdictive, inducing Sense of Agency
when the experienced outcome, when compared with the
action, allows an inference of causality (Moore & Obhi,
2012).
Sense of Agency is how we identify our own actions in the
world (Hoerl et al., 2020), and is argued to be a cornerstone of
human experience (Haggard, 2017; van Hateren, 2015).
Abnormalities in agency have been identified as a contributing
factor in an increasing number of clinical disorders
(Schimansky, David, Rössler, & Haker, 2010; Timmermans
& Schilbach, 2014). Depression is associated with deficient
Sense of Agency (Haggard & Chambon, 2012), whereas
schizophrenia is associated with both deficient and
misattributed agency (Garbarini et al., 2016). These dispar-
ities are argued to induce feelings of helplessness or loss of
volition (Haggard & Chambon, 2012). Agency is also of
cardinal importance among nonclinical populations be-
cause of its central role in society as the foundation for legal
responsibility; societies take Sense of Agency into account
when holding individuals responsible for unlawful acts
(Haggard, 2017; Hallett, 2018; Tsimploulis, Niveau,
Eytan, Giannakopoulos, & Sentissi, 2018).
Crucially, whereas action outcomes and their anticipation are
often closely linked to our naïve theories of physics and other
material interactions (e.g. electricity), this is not necessarily al-
ways the case. Your actions may also cause a corresponding
action from someone else, for example having another follow
your gaze to an intended object or laugh at your joke. This
Social Agency, the responsibility felt over a social effect, can
be construed as a specific kind of Sense of Agency (Brandi,
Kaifel, Bolis, & Schilbach, 2019), with important distinctions
that up until now have remained underspecified. One such dis-
tinction between social and nonsocial contexts is that social
interactions are much less predictable. Social effects are pro-
duced by an independent agent acting under their own volition
and therefore contain inherent variance, reducing expectations in
relation to action–effect fluency (Pfeiffer et al., 2014;
Stephenson, Edwards, Howard, & Bayliss, 2018). We would
expect a light to illuminate immediately upon pressing the
switch, whereas when leading another’s gaze, we expect them
to respond at a time and in a way of their choosing; in fact, when
another person reacts too quickly to our actions, wemay feel less
as the cause of their actions (Pfeiffer et al., 2012). This is
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relevant to Social Agency specifically as the predictability of the
social actor you are interacting with can modulate self-Social
Agency (Bolt & Loehr, 2017).
This element of high variance in social interactions illus-
trates why Social Agency should not simply be viewed as a
uniform construct. The temporal variance is unpredictable and
is modulated by fluid social influences, and can therefore in-
fluence Sense of Agency in different ways. Social Agency
will hence be experienced distinctly in different social con-
texts. Most importantly, this is only one example of many
complex components inherent in social interactions, which
may all influence Sense of Agency. This review will identify
key dimensions of social interaction that influence agency and
propose that Social Agency forms a continuum centred on one
principal dimension: cooperation.
What is Social Agency?
Explaining Social Agency as the responsibility over a so-
cial effect, as in the previous section, is in itself an over-
simplification of the construct, which in reality encom-
passes any situation in which any social aspects have a
bearing on how much Sense of Agency you will experi-
ence. Another person laughing at your joke provides an
easily understood example of what constitutes a social ef-
fect. In those circumstances, Social Agency is very much
individual: Your action causes an effect produced by anoth-
er (Social Agency [effect]), even if in reality pure isolation-
ist examples of action–reaction are probably rare. What this
example neglects to identify, however, is that there are oth-
er distinct circumstances in which Social Agency can arise.
A second instance of Social Agency is when two or more
individuals act together, forming a joint identity (Social
Agency [joint]). For example, when two people reposition
a sofa within a room, it can be construed that they are mov-
ing the sofa. It is this joint identity which is the defining
factor in creating Social Agency under these circumstances,
with the effect, the goal of the joint action, not necessarily
being social in nature. Finally, Social Agency can simply
arise from acting in a social context: being in the presence
of another independent agent (Social Agency [context]).
Consider, for example, completing the crossword of a
newspaper with someone glancing over your shoulder at
your progress. In this instance, the other is neither the target
of the action (as in [effect]), nor involved in the action (as in
[joint]), but their mere presence could influence your Sense
of Agency.
It is important to note that “effect,” “joint,” and “context”
should not be seen as categorically distinct types of Social
Agency, but rather as different dimensions along which a giv-
en situation can vary, and which are neither dependent on each
other, nor mutually exclusive. For instance, while moving a
sofa, even if the intended primary outcome is distinctly
nonsocial, there may be secondary outcomes (stronger feeling
of affiliation) that are social, and furthermore the way I am
moving with the sofa will, mediated by the overarching action
goal, influence the other’s movements, also constituting a so-
cial effect, just as my actions are their effect. It can even be
argued that the mere copresence of two agents, even if they do
not directly or indirectly influence each other’s behaviour,
changes their action affordances in that space (Gibson,
2014), without the need for specific joint actions or social
action effects. Drawing such distinctions lies outside of the
scope of this review. Instead, the three proposed dimensions
will be used to distinguish different ways in which research
has operationalized Social Agency, leading to divergent
results.
Before delving into the details, we would like to note that,
like its nonsocial equivalent, Social Agency is also a layered
construct, albeit with more nuances due to its social nature.
Low-level, sensorimotor processes inform our prereflective
feeling of agency (Balconi, 2010; Metcalfe & Greene,
2007). This is debatably correlated (Imaizumi & Tanno,
2019) to, only weakly correlated (Moore, Middleton,
Haggard, & Fletcher, 2012) to, or even dissociated (Dewey
& Knoblich, 2014; Grynszpan et al., 2019; Obhi & Hall,
2011a; Saito, Takahata, Murai, & Takahashi, 2015) from
our judgement of agency, which is a higher-level and re-
flective process operating through belief-like propositions
(Balconi, 2010). An additional, uniquely social, aspect is an
evaluative component to this higher level of Sense of
Agency, where a sense of moral responsibility causes the
evaluation of actions against sociocultural norms (Balconi,
2010; Montague & Lohrenz, 2007). For example, when
playing music on public transport, the normative behaviour
is to use earphones as to not disturb others, whereas listen-
ing alone does not require that evaluation. This evaluative
component has recently been found to be dissociable from
feeling agency (Caspar, Lo Bue, Magalhães De Saldanha da
Gama, Haggard, & Cleeremans, 2020), and can reduce self-
responsibility when coerced to perform reprehensible ac-
tions. For example, when following an order to administer
pain to another, less agency is experienced than when freely
choosing to perform the same act (Caspar, Cleeremans, &
Haggard, 2018).
While we would like to stress the importance of different
levels of agency experience, this review will focus on feeling
and judgement of agency, as these are most widely present in
the existing body of research, even if sometimes used inter-
changeably. For both of these levels, the review will address,
in a unified manner, studies which scrutinize all three in-
stances of Social Agency (“effect,” “joint,” and “context”).
What will become apparent as the review builds, is that spe-
cifically Social Agency (effect), which is arguably a core as-
pect, in that it may underly all three dimensions, is in and of
itself critically under researched.
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Issues with defining and measuring Social Agency
Conflicting views on Social Agency
As noted above, the different instances of Social Agency
are neither dependent on each other nor are they mutually
exclusive. Hence, it will come as little surprise that there are
widespread disparities in the research and findings on
Social Agency, and particularly regarding the definitions
of the overall construct. These disparties also manifest as
a lack of theories on how specific types of Social Agency
relate to each other. Here, we will use a few representative
examples to flesh out these concerns:
& Beyer, Sidarus, Bonicalzi, and Haggard (2017) state that
“the presence of others agents can lead to reduced out-
come monitoring and a reduction in individual sense of
agency, even in the absense of attributional ambiguity.”
(p. 144). This stance seems to predict universal reduced
Social Agency effects with or without attributional ambi-
guity, which is not the case (see Obhi & Hall, 2011a).
& Pfister, , Obhi, Rieger, and Wenke (2014) limit inferences
to only predictable social effects, stating that Sense of
Agency “not only occur[s] for physical effects in the en-
vironment, but also for social action effects, i.e. predict-
able actions of other agents” (p. 9).
& Authors investigating joint action or cooperative interac-
tion also generally restrict their inferences and describe
Social Agency effects within a narrow framework. In
joint action, Obhi and Hall (2011a) infer that “when two
individuals are involved in bringing about some effect, a
‘we’ identity is automatically (i.e. pre-reflectively)
formed, and both register agency” (p. 662). This does
not situate this specific instance of Social Agency within
the wider field, and hence a cohesive and comprehensive
picture of the construct cannot be developed.
& Finally, in a recent theoretical review, Brandi et al. (2019)
offer a surprisingly broad, and hence vague, definition of
Social Agency: “the sense of self that is gained through the
perceived control one exerts over the social world” (p. 18).
Previous work rebuts this definition, where it can be the
intrinsic lack of control (i.e. the unpredictability of social
outcomes) which induces Social Agency effects (Beyer
et al., 2017; Beyer, Sidarus, Fleming, & Haggard, 2018).
It is this lack of cohesion which the proposed continuum
framework seeks to address.
Difficulties in measuring Social Agency
Social Agency is not only difficult to define, but also to mea-
sure. There are intrinsic characteristics of social interactions
which confound traditional (nonsocial) measures. For
example, measuring Sense of Agency explicitly (i.e. judging
agency) through self-report in joint action is challenging.
Direct, explicit measures rely on reporting the self-
attribution of action effects: the extent to which one judges
oneself as an agent of a particular action and its consequence
(Moore et al., 2012), but when individuals act together, this
judgement is not clear cut, which might reflect the inherent
variance and uncertainty in judging Social Agency. Explicit
measures are also susceptible to cognitive self-biases, such as
the overestimation of self-agency (Tsakiris, Haggard, Franck,
Mainy, & Sirigu, 2005; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). These
factors make it difficult to unambiguously measure self-
agency or joint-agency effects in joint action (for discussion
of methodoligcal issues, see Bolt, Poncelet, Schultz, & Loehr,
2016; Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Le Bars, Devaux, Nevidal,
Chambon, & Pacherie, 2020).
The most commonly used implicit measure (i.e. feeling
agency: inferring agency from perceptual effects; Imaizumi
& Tanno, 2019) in Social Agency paradigms is Temporal
Binding: the subjective compression of the perceived time
interval between an action and its effect (Beck, Di Costa, &
Haggard, 2017; Buehner, 2012; Engbert, Wohlschläger,
Thomas, &Haggard, 2007). Temporal Binding is traditionally
measured in two ways: estimation of the perceived interval
between action and effect (Engbert et al., 2007) or judgements
of the perceived time of either action or effect separately
(Libet, 2002). Only the interval estimation method, where
participants verbally (Engbert et al., 2007), or through motor
replication (e.g. press and hold the space bar on a keyboard;
Stephenson et al., 2018), estimate the interval between action
and effect within the same trial, is possible in Social Agency
paradigms.
Whilst interval estimation gives a general measure of time
compression, Temporal Binding is argued to involve separate
action shifts, where perceived action is later than actual action
and/or outcome shifts, where perceived effect is earlier than
actual effect. Therefore, using separate action and effect
judgements allows for inspection of these components, which
possibly have different underlying mechanisms (see Tanaka,
Matsumoto, Hayashi, Takagi, & Kawabata, 2019), and is ar-
guably the superior measure (for review, see Wen, 2019).
Unfortunately, the standard time-point judgement method
cannot be easily used in Social Agency paradigms, as the need
to constantly monitor visual informaiton (i.e. an on-screen
clock face with rotating hand; Libet, 2002) greatly restricts
participants from focusing on any other visual, and indeed
nonvisual, information, such as the actions of an interaction
partner. Hence, in its current formulation, this method appears
unsuitable to assess the temporal binding elicited by Social
Agency. However, due to the greater specificity afforded by
the time-point judgement method, it would be prudent for
future Social Agency studies to determine whether an alterna-
tive method of assessing time of events, such as using an
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auditory oscillation or metronome instead of a visual
clockface, might be more amenable for measuring temporal
binding.
These complications may help to explain the somewhat
limited measurement methods for Social Agency, compared
with the wider set of options available to examine nonsocial
Sense of Agency. What is yet to be addressed, however, is
how specific experimental factors affect Social Agency,
which will be comprehensively covered in the section titled
Factors Influencing Sense of Agency.
Types of Social Agency
As reiterated throughout this review, it is crucial that an
evidence-based approach is used when building a comprehen-
sive model of Social Agency. Instead of trying to fit diverging
results to the same construct, resulting in widespread disagree-
ments in the field, it is prudent to categorize the existing liter-
ature by agency effects (enhancing or diminishing) to extract
key elements or dimensions which these paradigms share. The
strongest enhancement of agency is found in paradigms where
there is a high degree of cooperation between actors, inducing
a joint Social Agency (i.e. Joint Agency). Joint Agency is
subdivided into instances of ‘we’ agency (Obhi & Hall,
2011a), where the blurring of self–other distinction enhances
agency past the boundaries of the Self, and ‘shared’ agency,
where self–other distinction remains intact, creating a dual
sense of agency where one’s self agency and Joint Agency
coexist (Pacherie, 2012). Determining which type of Joint
Agency manifests in a paradigm relies, crucially, on whether
there is ambiguity over whose action causes an effect. There
are further paradigms where agency effects are dependent on
the agent’s role in a cooperative interaction. In cooperative
tasks with clearly defined hierarchical roles, vicarious agency
can be induced for the dominant actor over the subordinate’s
actions. Conversely, in such instances, the subordinate actor’s
agency is violated, resulting in diminished agency. Finally,
‘interfered’ agency is found in paradigms where there are ill-
defined goals or little or no cooperation between actors. In
these instances, it is the monitoring of predicted or actual
actions of the other which diminishes agency by interfering
with self-related processes (Beyer et al., 2017; Beyer et al.,
2018).
Each of these categories will be explored in this section.
The data and observations from studies implementing these
distinct paradigms provide the foundation for the development
of the concept of Social Agency as a continuum, centred on
the key dimension of cooperation. This concept will be ex-
plained in detail. The concept will also encompass traditional
nonsocial agency so that comparison may be made between
that and the Social Agency effects. As natural social interac-
tions are endless in variation, limitations of the continuum
framework will then be outlined in relation to the types of
interactions currently being studied (e.g. structured, transient).
‘We’ agency
We are often in circumstances where we must cooperate with
others to achieve shared goals (joint action goal; Clarke et al.,
2019; Sebanz et al., 2006). This may be at an individual (i.e.
with interaction partners) or group level. Importantly, in joint
action contexts, cooperative physical actions do not have to be
congruent to facilitate performance: Sebanz et al. (2006), state
that joint action is “any form of social interaction whereby two
or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time
to bring about a change in the environment” (p. 70). This is
true as long as incongruent actions between interaction part-
ners are complementary to the shared aim (Clarke et al., 2019;
Sartori & Betti, 2015). Interestingly, later in the same paper,
when describing agency in the context of joint action, Sebanz
et al. (2006) cast agency as a problem of causal ambiguity: “In
joint action, such problems of agency arise when one’s own
and others’ actions are carried out at approximately the same
time and result in similar effects” (p. 75). In doing so, they
clearly indicate that this interaction where action origin is
ambiguous is a specific form of joint action, whereby two
cooperating individuals do not just share an overarching joint
action goal, but do so to a degree where their individual ac-
tions have a joint and near simultaneous effect on the
environment.
The action ambiguity Sebanz et al. (2006) speak of is one
factor which can blur self–other boundaries to the point of
inducing ‘we’ agency. In a joint-action task which introduced
an element of ambiguity, it was found that both initiator and
responders exhibit Temporal Binding effects over their own
actions, but only the initiator reported explicit agency (Obhi &
Hall, 2011a). Participants were asked to perform a key press at
a time of their choosing 1–6 seconds after onset, and after a
further 200 ms, a tone would sound. Once the initiator per-
formed the key press, the responder was required to immedi-
ately make an equivalent key press. Measures of Temporal
Binding and feeling of causality over the effect (i.e. explicit
agency) were taken on each trial. Temporal Binding, but not
explicit agency, was observed in both participants both when
the roles were assigned on a block-wise basis and also when
they were established dynamically trial-wise by who acted
first. The dynamic condition greatly increased the ambiguity
over whose action caused the effect, inducing ‘we’, rather than
shared agency. The authors, indeed, argued that their findings
arose from the automatic formation of a joint agentic identity
with blurred self-ness (Obhi & Hall, 2011a).
Moving unintentionally in time with another (i.e. interper-
sonal rhythmic coordination or ‘social synchrony’; Kinreich,
Djalovski, Kraus, Louzoun, & Feldman, 2017; Launay, Tarr,
& Dunbar, 2016; Reddan, Young, Falkner, López-Solà, &
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Wager, 2020; Tarr, Launay, & Dunbar, 2016) can also pro-
duce the action origin ambiguity which induces ‘we’ agency
to form between parties. In a task where participants moved
their arm in time with a metronome, a confederate, visible on-
screen, moved either synchronously or asynchronously at the
same time (Reddish, Tong, Jong, & Whitehouse, 2020).
Participants believed the confederate to be a second partici-
pant who was either listening to the same or different metro-
nome rhythm. The ostensible purpose of the study was to
understand how people interact over video. When moving
synchronously, participants extended their own agency to that
of the other’s actions, experiencing a degree of agency over
these. Taken alone, this could be attributed to vicarious
agency—that is, the misattribution of another’s action to the
self (see the section titled Vicarious and Violated Agency), but
interestingly, synchrony was also found to lead participants to
report the other having a degree of agency over their own
actions. This indicates that some form of Joint Agency (argu-
ably, ‘we’ agency) was formed. Reddish and colleagues
(2020) concede that this was contrary to the prediction derived
from empirical findings of synchrony with a nonagentic enti-
ty, which again establishes Social Agency as distinct from
Sense of Agency more generally (see Kalckert & Ehrsson,
2012, 2014).
Interestingly, it appears that ‘we’ agency is not established
when performing joint action with a robotic partner
(Grynszpan et al., 2019). This is part of the wider discussion
into whether Social Agency effects are human centric and so
will be elaborated on in the section titled Social Agency With
Artificial Agents.
Shared agency
In interactions where the self–other distinction is intact, but
agents engage in joint action, shared agency is induced.
Initiating joint attention with another by leading their gaze is
a socially crucial instance of this, which has been studied
extensively using eye-tracking methodology (for review, see
Caruana, McArthur, Woolgar, & Brock, 2017b).
Leading the gaze of an on-screen face to an intended object
was demonstrated to increase Temporal Binding compared
with a control condition with a passive face (Stephenson
et al., 2018). Explicit measures mirrored implicit findings,
with increased agency ratings for active, compared with pas-
sive, faces (Stephenson et al., 2018). Interestingly, Temporal
Binding was also increased for a condition where joint atten-
tion was achieved without gaze leading. Participants looked
towards the intended object at its onset and the on-screen face
followed their gaze incidentally. This would imply that even
initiating joint attention without intention can enhance implicit
agency (Stephenson et al., 2018). This would suggest that how
shared agency is established is not important to the phenom-
enology of the initiator. However, it is not clear whether the
same Sense of Agency would be experienced if the partici-
pant’s gaze was led towards the object. Hence, the generaliz-
ability of the phenomenology of joint attention for all parties
remains untested. Participants in this study also never believed
the face on-screen was anything other than computer generat-
ed, limiting how social the interaction was perceived. The
agency behind computer-generated anthropomorphic charac-
ters is an important design consideration when scrutinizing
social phenomenon and shall be discussed in the section titled
Social Agency With Artificial Agents.
As mentioned previously, some level of coordination is
present in all joint action. In a joint-action task, a coordination
manipulation demonstrated that instances of mutual coordina-
tion between actors increased the level of shared control over
the task, compared with instances where only one of the actors
had to coordinate with the other (i.e. asymetrical coordination;
Bolt et al., 2016). This demonstrates that it is the mutuality of
coordination, which includes action monitoring and perceptu-
al predictability of the other’s actions and its consequences,
that induces a sense of shared agency (Bolt et al., 2016;
Pacherie, 2014).
Vicarious and violated agency
Joint-action tasks vary in how egalitarian or hierarchical they
are (Pacherie, 2012), which can impact Social Agency.Within
the literature, there is evidence supporting vicarious agency
(Clarke et al., 2019; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner,
Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004), and enhanced self-agency
(Obhi & Hall, 2011a; Reddish et al., 2020; Weiss, Herwig,
& Schütz-Bosbach, 2011) in egalitarian joint-action tasks.
Vicarious agency is when authorship of an action performed
by another is misattributed to the self (Wegner & Wheatley,
1999; Wegner et al., 2004). It has also been found that during
egalitarian joint action, implicit Sense of Agency (e.g.
Sensory Attenuation: reduction in the perceived phenomeno-
logical experience of external events; Beck et al., 2017; Weiss
et al., 2011) increases for both self-action and other-action
effects (Weiss et al., 2011).
Vicarious agency cannot be solely attributed to circum-
stances of Joint Agency. Vicarious agency is also exhibited
in hierarchical interactions, for dominant actors (Pfister et al.,
2014). Self and other Temporal Binding effects were scruti-
nized in two experiments with well-defined hierarchical roles,
where participant pairs were assigned leader and follower
roles (Pfister et al., 2014). Participants interacted with key
presses which produced tones (see Fig. 1 for trial procedure).
In Experiment 1, the leader performed a key press at a
time of their choice, generating a tone. This tone was a “go”
signal for the follower to perform a key press, which had to
be within a time limit. On each trial, each participant esti-
mated either the Leader Action-Tone Interval (Interval 1) or
the Tone Follower-Action Interval (Interval 2). In
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Experiment 2, the follower’s key press also generated a
tone and this new Follower Action-Tone Interval (Interval
3) was also estimated.
Temporal Binding was consistently exhibited by the leader
for their own Action-Tone Interval, which was as predicted
(Pfister et al., 2014). Interestingly, leaders also showed bind-
ing for the Tone-Follower Action Interval, but only when that
action produced its own subsequent tone (Pfister et al., 2014).
Pfister et al. (2014) propose that as the leader could choose
when to initiate the interaction and their action then prompted
the follower to act, this induced vicarious agency over the
follower and their action (Pfister et al., 2014). In support,
leading or following has been demonstrated to activate differ-
ent parts of the right intraparietal sulcus (Chaminade &
Decety, 2002), associated with the intention and action mon-
itoring components within Sense of Agency (Pfister et al.,
2014; Sidarus, Vuorre, & Haggard, 2017).
Arguably, the most interesting component of the Pfister
et al. (2014) study is the opposing agency effects for the leader
and follower roles. The follower never exhibited binding ef-
fects for their own or leader action intervals, and no binding
was exhibited from either participant for the Follower Action-
Tone Interval (3). The follower’s volition was restricted,
resulting in ‘violated’ agency, in this paradigm by multiple
elements: the overt label of follower, only acting in response
to prior actions in each trial sequence, reacting to a prescribed
‘go’ signal, and the time limit in which to perform the action.
This is against prediction, as even without intentionality, the
causal links between action and tone should still induce some
degree of binding effects (Buehner, 2015; Buehner &
Humphreys, 2009; Imaizumi & Tanno, 2019; Moore &
Obhi, 2012; Suzuki, Lush, Seth, & Roseboom, 2019). It ap-
pears that this violation of agency is powerful enough to over-
ride these effects. When evaluating this study, there must also
be consideration that the effect of both the leader and follower
action is not a direct social response; the interaction is medi-
ated by tones. This not only creates more temporal disparity
between actions, but may diminish the perception of how
social the interaction actually is, impeding wider inferences
relating to Social Agency.
The findings of Pfister et al. (2014) have been replicated in
other paradigms which defined leader and follower roles (Bolt
et al., 2016; Reddish et al., 2020). When a leader dictated the
speed of a synchronous arm movement with a follower, the
leader experienced vicarious agency over the follower’s ac-
tions, and conversely, the follower attributed the agency of
their actions to the leader (Reddish et al., 2020). What is in-
teresting about Reddish and colleagues’ (2020) result was that
the same task with egalitarian roles was found to induce
shared agency (see section titled Shared Agency ). Even when
engaging in coordinated action, which generally induces
shared agency, introducing asymmetrical coordination
through leader and follower roles influences how shared or
independent each actor rates their own actions. Leaders report
independent agency, whilst followers report shared agency,
negating their own agentic status (Bolt et al., 2016). This
demonstrates that even small differences in an actor’s role
within the same interaction modulates Social Agency effects.
Fig. 1 Modified representation of the Pfister et al. (2014) trial sequence for Experiments 1 and 2 (grey section Experiment 2 only), showing timing
information, actions according to actor roles, and tones
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Interfered agency
Most of our social interactions are loose interactions, whereby
a joint goal is not defined beyond exchanging some informa-
tion or having a nice time together. Typically, such situations
may elicit entrainment or other dyadic alignment, but there is
rarely any ambiguity about who caused a specific joint action
effect, because very often there isn’t one. Instead, within the
dyad the agents act and react to one another and their actions
hence become both causes and effects, often within an over-
arching nonlinear dynamic.
When interacting with an agent who appears independent
(i.e. little or no cooperation), our agency appears to diminish.
When participants were led to believe that they were
interacting with another person, their explicit agency ratings
were reduced (Beyer et al., 2017), and it elicited different
neural activity from that associated with nonsocial Sense of
Agency (Beyer et al., 2018). Social contexts were associated
with an increase of activity in brain areas responsible for
mentalizing processes, including the precuneus (Beyer et al.,
2018). The precuneus is most consistently active in mental
imagery tasks, including visuospatial perspective taking
(Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014). The
authors proposed a model for Sense of Agency where the
presence of another independent agent, making their own ac-
tions, interferes with action selection (i.e. self-action planning
processes; Beyer et al., 2017; Beyer et al., 2018). It is this
interference, or action disfluency, that is argued to reduce
agency (Beyer et al., 2017; Beyer et al., 2018; Haggard,
2017; Metcalfe & Greene, 2007).
A way of improving the agentic status of an actor is to give
them an action choice (Pfeiffer et al., 2012). This study inves-
tigated the effect of social response latency and presence of
joint attention on an explicit measure of Social Agency
(Pfeiffer et al., 2012). Participants were seated in a room with
a confederate with whom they believed they were interacting
behind a partition. They were presented with two everyday
objects on either side of a central anthropomorphic avatar
whom they believed was controlled by the eye movements
of their interaction partner. On each trial, participants fixated
on the avatar, then chose which object to saccade to. After a
variable interval, the avatar would then either follow gaze to
the same object or avert gaze to the other object, establishing
joint attention or nonjoint attention, respectively. Participants
were then asked to rate the relatedness of the other’s action to
their own on a 4-point scale, from very related to very
unrelated. Results demonstrated gaze following was rated as
related to the participant’s action, whereas gaze aversion was
rated as unrelated; ratings were consistent across latencies.
Pfeiffer et al. (2012) explain these results in relation to va-
lence. As initiating joint attention is seen as intrinsically re-
warding and positive (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007;
Grynszpan et al., 2017), this would explain the increase in
relatedness ratings. Conversely, the authors argue that gaze
aversion is viewed as negative, which would explain the de-
crease in the relatedness ratings. However, it is limiting to
interpret the results only in terms of valence. Results could
suggest that participants were attributing vicarious agency
(see the section titled Vicarious and Violated Agency) to ac-
tions which followed their own, with gaze aversion being
attributed to the other’s agentic status. Both these attributions
may explain why relatedness ratings are consistent, even as
temporal contiguity decreases: the other is understood to be
making a volitional temporal choice, with or without agentic
status (Pfeiffer et al., 2012). This extended inference ties in
with a follow-up experiment which was conducted where the
action of the other was restricted to always follow the gaze of
the participant. In this experiment, agency decreased linearly
beyond a short latency (Pfeiffer et al., 2012). With no action
choice, the agency attributions (vicarious or agentic) diminish
as temporal contiguity decreases, in line with nonsocial find-
ings (for review, see Wen, 2019).
Exhibiting a diminished Sense of Agency in social interac-
tions when interacting with an independent agent may also be
an underlying factor in wider behavioural phenomenon relat-
ing to diffusion of responsibility. Behaviourally, diffusion of
responsibility has been demonstrated to reduce an individual’s
likelihood of assisting in an emergency (The Bystander Effect;
Barley & Latanfi, 1968) and effort invested in group tasks
(social loafing; Williams et al., 1993), whilst conversely in-
creasing aggression (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson,
1975) and risk taking (Teger & Pruitt, 1967). This reduction
in the Agency while acting in social contexts, observed in the
behavioural phenomena associated with diffusion of respon-
sibility, supports Beyer et al.’ (2017) model of Social Agency.
For a concise summary of the types of Social Agency covered
in the section titled Types of Social Agency, see Table 1.
Social Agency continuum
The above evaluation of the evidence related to Social
Agency allows us to develop a novel picture of the relation-
ship between the different types of Social Agency. We pro-
pose Social Agency as a continuum, where various ele-
ments of cooperation (e.g. predictability of others’ actions)
within a social interaction may enhance or diminish Sense
of Agency to varying degrees, resulting in ‘we’, shared,
vicarious, violated, or interfered agency. Figure 2 depicts
the proposed continuum, comparing where agency types sit
in relation to enhanced or diminished effects. Nonsocial
(i.e. environmental) Sense of Agency is used as a theoreti-
cal neutral position for comparison. The types of Social
Agency are depicted as merging colours to emphasize that
Social Agency is a complex construct, where conflicting
influences or interaction elements mean that there are no
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clean-cut boundaries between the various types; many in-
teractions can move from one Social Agency type to anoth-
er by simply manipulating one element. As discussed
above, most of the extant literature reviewed scrutinizes
Social Agency (joint) and (context)—therefore, this contin-
uum is based mainly on these instances. With little empir-
ical evidence for Social Agency (effect), it is not as clear
how this instance fits into the model. Conservatively, we
can speculate that prosocial responses from another would
enhance agency (Pfeiffer et al., 2012; Stephenson et al.,
2018), whilst antisocial responses would diminish agency
(Pfeiffer et al., 2012). It is also important to note that this
continuum is not a scale and that Social Agency is not one
dimensional. As will be discussed later in this section, there
are many interaction dimensions critically underresearched
in relation to Social Agency, and whilst this continuum is
centred around the degree of cooperation in an interaction,
as Social Agency grows as a field, it is hoped that more key
elements will be incorporated into this model.
Egalitarian social interactions with higher degrees of coop-
eration are argued to enhance the Social Agency compared
with nonsocial agency. Cooperation is of distinct evolutionary
and sociocultural benefit, so this comes as no surprise. We
speculate that feeling an enhanced Sense of Agency in inter-
actions with mutual goals, responsiveness, and outcomes pro-
motes further engagement in these types of interactions. This
aligns with the proposal that humans have a predisposition for
cooperation, motivated by “the rewarding nature of the active
participation in social interactions” (Pfeiffer et al., 2014, p.
135). As multiple parties can achieve larger goals or goals
more quickly than any individual, this helps in developing
human interdependence and a speed of cultural growth far
beyond any other species. This phenomenon, known as
Cumulative Culture Evolution, sees generational gains in cul-
tural complexity more than what any individual could achieve
(Mesoudi & Thornton, 2018).
This review argues that the most enhancing type of Joint
Agency is ‘we’ agency. Above and beyond the forming of a
shared agentic identity (as in shared agency), ‘we’ agency has
an additional component of blurring the boundaries between
self and other (Pacherie, 2012). This blurring of the self is
experienced not only positively but also pleasurably (Wahn,
Table 1 Summary of types of Social Agency, including both an everyday and empirical example
Social Agency
type
Everyday example Study example Explanation/Details
‘We’ agency In a room with more than one entrance,
two people entering, flicking different
light switches simultaneously, and
wondering who actually caused the
light to turn on
Obhi and Hall (2011a)—Dynamic condi-
tion where who acted first changed
trial-wise, increasing ambiguity over
who cause the tone 200-ms later
• Joint action
• Formation of a joint agentic identity
between parties
• Egalitarian
• Blurring of the self/other boundary
Shared agency Two people repositioning a sofa within a
room
Stephenson et al. (2018)—Initiating joint
attention with another on an intended
object
• Joint action
• Formation of a joint agentic identity
between parties
• Egalitarian




At work, instructing a subordinate staff
member to do a task
Pfister et al. (2014)—Leader role in the
action/tone interaction sequence
• ‘Leader’ roles with free action to initiate
interaction
• Misattribution of action of another
(follower) to self
• Hierarchical contexts, distinct roles
Violated agency A superior staff member instructing you
to execute a task at work
Pfister et al. (2014)—Follower role in the
action/tone interaction sequence
• ‘Follower’ roles where there is a restriction
of own action in response to an action of
another
• Restricted volition resulting in not
attributing own action to self
• Hierarchical context, distinct roles
Interfered
agency
‘How are you?’—Asking an open
question whit no expected response or
more than one plausible predicted
answer
Beyer et al. (2017)—Making an action to
prevent a negative outcome in the
presence of another agent who may or
may not also act, compared with the
same action alone
• Other without expected action, seen as an
independent agent
• Process of predicting other action interferes
with own-action process
• Increased cognitive load
•Only abiding by social norms (e.g. prosocial
response of gaze following) causes any
attribution of other’s action to own agency
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Kingstone, & König, 2018). The sociological theorist Emile
Durkheim regarded this blurring as something called ‘collec-
tive effervescence’, where groups can have a heightened col-
lective emotional excitement not found in individuals
(Gabriel, Naidu, Paravati, Morrison, & Gainey, 2020). As an
example, imagine the enjoyment of going to a sold-out concert
and ponder whether the same music would sound as good in
an empty stadium. This blurring could mean that agency ex-
pands vicariously to all persons present. Experimentally this
has so far only be demonstrated to extend to one other, but
theoretically this could be the same for any number of parties.
As discussed in the section titled ‘We’ Agency, synchrony
is a phenomenon which can help induce ‘we’ agency. As
humans have social networks larger than would be expected
by our brain size, mechanisms such as synchrony facilitate
social bonding (Tarr et al., 2016; Tunçgenç & Cohen, 2016),
which encourages group cohesion (Launay et al., 2016).
Social synchrony has been demonstrated in the synchroniza-
tion of different body movements (see Richardson &
Johnston, 2005; Schmidt, Carello, & Turvey, 1990) and is
pervasive to an extent that it can even override the natural
(eigen)frequency of a rocking chair when sitting next to some-
one (Richardson, Marsh, Isenhower, Goodman, & Schmidt,
2007). This ties in with the benefits of cooperative social in-
teractions and why we jointly experience such interactions
(Sebanz et al., 2006). It is even possible that mutual synchrony
changes an interaction from being perceived as one with in-
dependent agents to one with ‘we’ agency, as in Reddish et al.
(2020).
Whilst shared agency can also enhance Sense of Agency,
the concept of the Self is still intact, and as such, is a modulator
for the degree of agency experienced. This is why shared agen-
cy is depicted in the continuum as enhancing, but to a lesser
extent than ‘we’ agency. Shared agency arises once again
through a degree of cooperation, in prosocial actions such as
leading gaze to initiate joint attention (Frischen et al., 2007;
Pfeiffer et al., 2014) or mutual coordination (Bolt et al.,
2016), but in these circumstances, there is no ambiguity over
action origin. Initiating joint attention is known to recruit acti-
vation of the ventral striatum, a brain area associated with
reward-related neurocircuitry (Pfeiffer et al., 2014; Rilling &
Sanfey, 2011). This area is exclusively activated in social con-
texts; nonsocial interaction only activates attentional networks
(Pfeiffer et al., 2014). This demonstrates the uniquely reward-
ing nature of social interactions (Pfeiffer et al., 2014), which
enhance Social Agency (Pfeiffer et al., 2012).
The next two types of agency to discuss are somewhat
linked. Vicarious agency is enhanced agency through attrib-
uting other’s actions to the Self, whereas, conversely, violated
agency is where no or little agency is experienced for self-
actions. These regularly manifest in the same paradigm, by
the introduction of hierarchical roles within an interaction.
All of the studies reviewed use leader and follower roles to
induce vicarious and violated agency, respectively (Bolt et al.,
2016; Pfister et al., 2014; Reddish et al., 2020). Whilst there
can be cooperative elements to an interaction, the change in
power dynamic is a more salient element in relation to how
people experience agency. With distinct roles, the Self is very
much intact, and therefore vicarious agency is depicted as
having enhancing effects similar to shared agency, perhaps
slightly less so. Violated agency is depicted as having the most
diminished Social Agency, since an important component of
Fig. 2 Depiction of Social Agency as a continuum of cooperation with
enhanced or diminished Sense of Agency effects in comparison to
nonsocial agency. Each type of Social Agency that can be induced in
an interaction is shown as a different colour along the continuum (e.g.
‘we’ agency as yellow). The colours deliberately merge to illustrate that
these types of Social Agency are not clearly defined categories; the
manipulation of one of more interaction elements can shift the kind of
agency induced from one to another
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agency, volition, is compromised. It is interesting that both
subordinate and dominant actors view the subordinate’s agen-
cy as diminished (Pfister et al., 2014). This could also explain
why robotic interaction partners may not be attributed with an
agentic status (see section titled Social AgencyWith Artificial
Agents); actions are perceived to be preprogrammed and not
generated through free will.
Interactions with little or no cooperation also diminish
Social Agency, as having to predict actions in these circum-
stances is much harder, interfering with self-agentic processes.
Without any consensus between parties as in cooperative in-
teraction, conspecific effects (i.e. the responding actions of
another) are far less predictable than environmental effects,
and hence engender diminished Social Agency. As the empir-
ical evidence demonstrates, there may once again be vicarious
agency from an initiator in an interaction over the response of
another, but that this is only exhibited when the response is a
chosen prosocial response (as in Pfeiffer et al., 2012). As we
are a socially driven species, when no other predictive cues
can be relied upon, the expectation of another performing a
prosocial response prevails (Grynszpan et al., 2017), and a
positively valenced self-serving bias attributes this to the ini-
tiator (Wang et al., 2017). Conversely, chosen antisocial re-
sponses are attributed to the agentic status of the other
(Pfeiffer et al., 2012). This is interesting because it is some-
thing which has been demonstrated to be capable of changing
dynamically (Pfeiffer et al., 2012).
From the limited empirical evidence and continuity with
other social psychology and sociological theories, this review
argues that viewing Social Agency as a continuummediated by
degree of cooperation is the model which best fits what we
currently know. That being said, it is important to acknowledge
the limitations of this theory; there are still a host of unexplored
interaction dimensions within Social Agency (see Box 1 for an
overview of social interaction dimensions). For example, how
Social Agency is influenced in larger-scale group interaction is
completely unknown; current empirical investigation focusses
exclusively on individual (dyadic) interactions. Even within
this individual parameter, there is a scarcity of studies with
clearly defined roles that would replicate a hierarchical interac-
tion structure. Also, within cooperative contexts the association
between partners has so far always been of a novel, transient
nature, limited to that experiment. Pacherie (2012, 2014) iden-
tifies the longevity of association between partners to be a key
dimension of cooperative interaction. Hence, establishing par-
adigms with repeated sessions or using participants with
preexisting rapport would allow testing the influence of
longer-term associations. Furthermore, it remains to be seen
to what degree Social Agency is determined by the relative
pivotality of each agent in a cooperation. Pivotality, which
refers to the degree to which an individual can impact the
outcome, can be influenced by several factors, like roles, sym-
metry, or synchronicity of actions. In a recent paper, Le Bars
et al. (2020) show that individual versus collective Judgements
of Control (JoC) are differentially sensitive to manipulations of
agents’ pivotality.
Box 1 Dimensions of social interaction
Structural dimensions
Physical < - - - > Virtual
Cooperative < - - - > Independent
Individual < - - - > Group
Small-scale < - - - > Large-scale
Generalized < - - - > Specialized
Egalitarian < - - - > Hierarchical
Equal pivotality < - - - > Unequal pivotality
Transient < - - - > Stable
Normative < - - - > Novel
Simple < - - - > Complex
Motivational dimensions
Self < - - - > Group
Cooperative < - - - > Competitive
Goal < - - - > Enjoyment
Adapted and expanded from Pacherie’s (2012, 2014) work on joint
actions, dimensions of social interaction are defined and categorized
into structural or motivational aspects. Little is still known about how
each of these dimensions influence Social Agency and if the influences
of different dimensions are congruent or conflicting with each other.
With social interactions being capable of involving dimensions on different
levels of functionality, opposing ends of the same dimensionmay also be
within one interaction. Take, for example, a chess game: There has to be
a certain level of cooperation, where players take turns to make a move
and adhere to the rules, but there is also a competitive element, as each
player wants to win. What defines the interaction is ultimately the level
which has the strongest motivational element (see Cho et al., 2020), so in
the instance of a chess game, the competitive influence will be stronger
than the cooperative.
There is also a scarcity of studies scrutinizing competitive
social contexts (see Cho, Escoffier, Mao, Green, & Davis,
2020). With competition being another aspect intrinsic to hu-
man society, it is of utmost importance that we learn more
about how this affects Social Agency. Competition brings
with it conflicting agency influences which are identified in
this review: The positive self-bias could enhance Sense of
Agency in victory and diminish in defeat, but the nature of
competitive contexts could enhance self–other distinction, in-
creasing interference and diminishing agency even more.
Group contexts would complicate things further by introduc-
ing levels of both cooperation and competition to the same
interaction, where individuals work together cooperatively to
then compete as one identity against another. As joint
cooperative–competitive contexts are prevalent in all aspects
of life, from recreational sports to employment, this would
offer a highly relevant aspect to conduct research on.
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Factors influencing Sense of Agency
Focus now moves from the currently unexplored dimensions
of Social Agency to questions which arise from the existing
literature. With there being widespread variation in measures
of Sense of Agency, and recognized conditions which need to
be satisfied for Sense of Agency to arise (e.g. temporal conti-
guity, predictability), it is important to evaluate experimental
factors whichmay also influence Sense of Agency. This might
be especially pertinent in Social Agency paradigms as exper-
imental manipulation will allow systematic evaluation of the
contributions of top-down (i.e. perceptual) or bottom-up (i.e.
sensory) processes. The factors detailed below are those
which differ in influence or importance for social, compared
with nonsocial, Sense of Agency, highlighting again why
Social Agency in itself is a distinct construct. The factors are
synthesized into Table 2 to aid comparison, split into columns
for Nonsocial Agency and Enhanced and Diminished Social
Agency.
There are several other factors which are reported to influ-
ence Sense of Agency more generally and should also be
considered; these include physical effort (Howard, Edwards,
& Bayliss, 2016), cognitive load (Hon, Poh, & Soon, 2013;
Howard et al., 2016), coercion (Caspar, Christensen,
Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2016), and prior bias or priming
(Cravo, Haddad, Claessens, & Baldo, 2013; Sidarus,
Chambon, & Haggard, 2013; Sidarus et al., 2017).
However, this review will not incorporate these factors due
to lack of evidence in relation to Social Agency effects.
Temporal contiguity
Temporal contiguity (or temporal predictability; Ruess,
Thomaschke, & Kiesel, 2017) is of special interest to Social
Agency, as social outcomes are reasoned to contain more
inherent variance than nonsocial ones, which are relatively
immediate (Pfeiffer et al., 2014; Stephenson et al., 2018).
Most studies investigating Sense of Agency manipulate tem-
poral contiguity by varying the onset of the effect after action
(Cravo, Claessens, & Baldo, 2011; Haggard, Clark, &
Kalogeras, 2002; Pfeiffer et al., 2012; Pfister et al., 2014;
Stephenson et al., 2018). Some studies use this to evaluate if
there is a point of optimal contiguity (MacKenzie, 2013), or a
nonlinear time course for Sense of Agency effects (Pfeiffer
et al., 2012; Ruess, Thomaschke, & Kiesel, 2018b). Others
simply collapse different delay conditions during analysis,
using them as experimental jitter to optimize engagement
(Stephenson et al., 2018).
One study (Pfeiffer et al. 2012) demonstrated that when the
‘other’ in a social interaction was given their own action
choice, temporal contiguity was no longer a condition to
experience Sense of Agency. This represents an important
difference for Social, compared with nonsocial agency.
This finding was robust for gaze latencies up to 4 seconds,
a considerable delay for a gaze-related action. Whilst this sug-
gests the irrelevance of temporal contiguity in social interac-
tion, this finding needs further investigation and replication;
one study cannot provide conclusive evidence. This finding is
also contrary to the theory that reactivity from a partner, de-
termined by temporal contingency and congruency, strongly
influences self-Social Agency (Brandi et al., 2019; Bratman,
1992). How temporal contiguity affects Sense of Agency in
cooperative social contexts is still unknown. When
cooperating with another, it may be that there is indeed some
degree of temporal expectancy for the responding action in
line with Brandi et al. (2019), relating to the joint goal. This
would also tie in with one of Bratman’s (1992) defined theo-
retical features of joint actions: mutual responsiveness. The
shared goals from joint action are seen to induce circum-
stances where each party has a reciprocal expectation and duty
of responsiveness, relying on cues from each other to achieve
this (Bratman, 1992; Pacherie, 2012).
Pfeiffer et al. (2012) only used a somewhat indirect explicit
measure of Social Agency. Hence, there are no current pre-
dictions of how temporal contiguity may affect implicit mea-
sures. One study did manipulate temporal contiguity of action
and effect and measured Temporal Binding (Stephenson et al.,
2018), but this temporal variation was discarded in analysis by
computing the deviance of the reported interval from the ac-
tual interval (in terms of percentages) and averaging these
across conditions.
A recent review (Wen, 2019) assessed the impact of out-
come delay on different Sense of Agency measures in nonso-
cial settings. It found that whilst explicit judgements de-
creased linearly as delay increased (Wen, Yamashita, &
Asama, 2015) and Sensory Attenuation effects faded when
delay exceeded 200 ms (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999)
as would be expected, Temporal Binding results diverged.
Some studies report the strongest binding at very short delays
(150 and 250 ms, respectively; Haggard et al., 2002; Ruess,
Thomaschke, & Kiesel, 2018a), whereas other studies report
stronger binding as intervals increase (Buehner &
Humphreys, 2009; Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Ruess et al.,
2017; Wen et al., 2015). This makes it difficult to predict
how temporal contiguity in different social contexts may af-
fect Temporal Binding, given that even results for nonsocial
agency do not converge. The review (Wen, 2019) does con-
cede that the binding divergence found may be due to meth-
odological differences, rather than direct influence (Dewey &
Knoblich, 2014; Wen, 2019). There may be differences in
when action effects are expected, depending on modality of
cue and/or outcome. As auditory processing is faster than
visual processing (Formby, Morgan, Forrest, & Raney,








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































surmised that the expectation of an auditory effect would be
faster, leading to the strongest Sense of Agency at shorter
intervals. There may also be an effect of action (or task) type.
Where tasks require multisensory processing (thus increasing
cognitive load), there could be suppressed Temporal Binding
for the shortest delays (Hon et al., 2013; Howard et al., 2016).
This again highlights the importance of clear design principles
and field-wise consensus on methodology to produce compa-
rable measures.
Action choice and outcome control
Whilst action choice and outcome control concern different
processing stages—action selection and action execution, re-
spectively—here, we group them together, as they are both
centred round the same concept: control. Sense of Agency
arises only when actions are performed voluntarily (Haggard
et al., 2002). As action choice is seen as a crucial aspect of
agentic experience and enhances control (Wenke, Fleming, &
Haggard, 2010), it would also seem reasonable that choosing
action frommultiple options would enhance Sense of Agency,
aligning with wider societal concepts interlinking freedom,
choice, and agency (Chen, 2013; Krause, 2012). Action
choices increasing Sense of Agency was confirmed by a
Libet (2002) clock Temporal Binding paradigm, where it
was demonstrated that binding linearly increased as action
options increased (i.e. increased choice of which key on
keyboard to press in response; Barlas & Obhi, 2013), even
though the outcome was consistent. This study is notable be-
cause of the stringent design: Action choice was specifically
isolated while temporal contiguity and outcome were con-
trolled throughout. As no explicit measure was employed,
replicating this design with such a measure would be a perti-
nent avenue for further research, allowing comparison of the
influence of action choice on both implicit and explicit agen-
cy. It can be predicted that action choice would increase agen-
cy even in social contexts and may even be enhanced further
in certain contexts. Within Social Agency, it may be more
important to choose an action in interdependent contexts to
establish your agentic status to the other. On the other hand, as
cooperative contexts induce ‘we’ agency, action choice may
be less relevant to agency than outcome choice, which would
be congruent or incongruent to the shared aim established by
cooperation. It may even be that action choice for the interac-
tion initiator hinders Social Agency as this could increase
ambiguity of the mutual goal.
In nonsocial interactions, action choice is employed exper-
imentally as a way of controlling outcome, which makes the
two elements inextricably linked. In a Temporal Binding par-
adigm with painful and nonpainful somatosensory outcomes,
it was shown that controlling the intensity of outcome through
probabilistic discriminative action selection increased binding
(both action and outcome shift), and more so with painful
outcomes (Beck et al., 2017). The fact that binding was greater
for painful outcomes also suggests binding was modulated by
the motivational significance of the outcome (Beck et al.,
2017). These findings link concepts of volition and evaluation
of valanced outcomes (motivation) to agency. Conversely, in
a recent Temporal Binding paradigm where a single, con-
trolled action produced a controlled outcome in the majority
of cases (83%), unexpected outcomes increased binding ef-
fects (Majchrowicz & Wierzchoń, 2018). Whilst this finding
was contrary to prediction, explicit agency judgements greatly
diminished for unexpected outcomes, in line with prediction.
Authors speculate that the high saliency of unexpected out-
comes, due to scarcity of occurrence, could have induced “hy-
per” Temporal Binding (Majchrowicz & Wierzchoń, 2018, p.
320). This hyper Temporal Binding was argued to manifest
through temporal prediction errors, as when action–effect de-
lay was consistent between controlled and unexpected out-
comes and only qualitative properties differed (i.e. frequency
and waveform), this effect disappeared (Majchrowicz &
Wierzchoń, 2018). However, the authors concede that hyper
Temporal Binding effects reduced over experimental blocks
as participants habituated to the unexpected outcomes. Again,
finding divergence between studies is unsurprising when
methodologies vary considerably.
In relation to Social Agency, whilst the experimental aspect
of outcome choice can be separated from action choice, it also
becomes more complex, as it is the responding action of an
independent agent. With this in mind, Pfeiffer et al. (2012)
discovered that giving an action choice (i.e. experimental out-
come choice) to the ‘other’ in a social interaction increased
their status as an independent agent. This may inhibit self-
agency by disrupting the causal link between the initiating
action and the responding action of the ‘other’; the responding
action has its own agency. Social outcomes also come with
their own intrinsic motivations, which, as discussed above,
can modulate Temporal Binding. Prosocial outcomes are in-
herently desirable, inducing reward-like neural activation
(Pfeiffer et al., 2014; Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). Therefore, so-
cial outcomes seen as prosocial, such as action following,
engaging in joint attention, or gaze following, which are
chosen by the ‘other’ may enhance binding effects.
Modality of outcome
Sense of Agency paradigms employ visual, auditory, or so-
matic stimuli for action outcomes. The effect of outcome mo-
dality on Sense of Agencywas recently investigated in a meta-
analysis of Temporal Binding paradigms (Tanaka et al.,
2019). Findings suggested that Temporal Binding effects are
more robust for auditory compared with visual or somatic
stimuli (Tanaka et al., 2019). This ties in with the inference
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that somatic effects are less distinct from action production
and therefore do not reliably reflect causality (Engbert et al.,
2007). The differences in temporal resolution of processing
between modalities may also contribute to this finding, with
auditory processing known to be faster than visual (Formby
et al., 1992; Shimojo et al., 2001; Welch et al., 1980). These
findings suggest that relying on auditory stimuli for Temporal
Binding measures would be prudent. Differences in modality
are also relevant for a deeper examination of action and out-
come shifts. Outcome shifts alone are reported for visual stim-
uli (Ruess, Thomaschke, Haering, Wenke, & Kiesel, 2018),
whilst action shifts alone are reported for somatic stimuli
(Tanaka et al., 2019). Effect sizes are also larger for outcome
shifts in general, across modalities (Tanaka et al., 2019).
Taking all of these findings into account, it would be advisable
to rely on auditory outcomes for Temporal Binding paradigms
and to use time-point judgements for measurement (where
possible; see section titled Difficulties in Measuring Social
Agency). However, it must be conceded that little is known
about outcome modalities for different measures of Sense of
Agency, so this reliance cannot be prescriptive without further
investigation.
With actions such as eye movements having pervasive so-
cial importance, modality of outcomes for Social Agency par-
adigms will have additional considerations. It may be that the
social importance (i.e. social weight) of the outcomemodality,
may modulate binding effects. Responding to a leading eye
movement in kind and initiating joint attention is a strong
prosocial signal (Frischen et al., 2007; Pfeiffer et al., 2014;
Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). This would be more so than a con-
gruent auditory or somatic action outcome as we are attuned to
respond to gaze social cues from infancy (Friesen &
Kingstone, 1998). It may be that visual outcomes elicit en-
hanced binding effects, specifically in social contexts where
the action outcome is a congruent eye movement of the ‘other’
to a leading eye movement of the interaction initiator.
Accordingly, some of the most prominent Social Agency
studies discussed in this review (Pfeiffer et al., 2012;
Stephenson et al., 2018) have indeed been conducted using
eye-movement interactions.
Wider Considerations
Social Agency with artificial agents
With the current state of research on Social Agency still very
much in the exploratory stage, and there being many method-
ological considerations to be taken into account, it is advanta-
geous to broaden horizons when considering future research
design. A crucial aspect of social psychology research in gen-
eral is the ecological validity of paradigms (for example,
Albert & de Ruiter, 2018; Hermans et al., 2019; Kingstone,
Laidlaw, Nasiopoulos, & Risko, 2017; Reader & Holmes,
2016; Risko, Richardson, & Kingstone, 2016; Schlichting
et al., 2018); effort must be made to successfully induce a
social context. As most social research is screen-mediated to
give more experimental control, virtual characters or
preprogrammed human stimuli (e.g. videos, photos) are used
to interact with participants (Caruana, de Lissa, & McArthur,
2017a; Gobel, Kim, &Richardson, 2015). Importantly, virtual
characters may be believed to be avatars with human agency
or computer-controlled agents (Caruana, de Lissa, et al.,
2017a). This distinction is vital when wishing to examine
social phenomena.
Investigation into whether anthropomorphic representation
(social appearance) or human agency (social relevance) is
required to produce reflexive orienting of visual attention re-
vealed that it is social relevance that drives it (Gobel et al.,
2018; Wiese, Wykowska, Zwickel, & Müller, 2012).
Performance in a visual cue task was facilitated when partic-
ipants believed a dot on screen was the representation of an-
other participant’s gaze location, compared with a computer-
generated location (Gobel et al., 2018). This finding is made
even more relevant by the finding that brain activity elicited
by the same avatar stimuli can differ depending on agency
beliefs (Caruana, de Lissa, et al., 2017a). Using electroenceph-
alography (EEG), larger event-related potentials (ERPs) in the
left occipitotemporal region and exclusive activation within
the centroparietal region were observed when reacting to hu-
man-controlled, compared with computer-controlled, virtual
characters. This relates to Social Agency research in that to
truly induce a social interaction, participants should believe
that they are interacting with another even if this is deceptive
(as in Beyer et al., 2017; Beyer et al., 2018; Pfeiffer et al.,
2012), rather than paradigms merely presenting stimuli with
social appearance (as in Stephenson et al., 2018), which can
undermine the validity of social inferences.
The difference in Sense of Agency between human–human
and human–computer interaction has been overtly measured
in joint-action paradigms (Grynszpan et al., 2019; Obhi &
Hall, 2011b; Sahaï, Desantis, Grynszpan, Pacherie, &
Berberian, 2019). In a task where outcome attribution was
ambiguous between partners, it was demonstrated that
interacting with a computer partner failed to induce
Temporal Binding effects or explicit agency attributions like
those found when interacting with a conspecific; ‘we’ agency
can only be induced by human–human interaction (Obhi &
Hall, 2011b). Even in conditions where ambiguity is removed
and participants know the outcome was caused by their action,
interacting with a computer in a joint task inhibits binding
effects (Obhi & Hall, 2011b; Sahaï et al., 2019). This suggests
Joint Agency is human centric (Limerick, Coyle, & Moore,
2014; Sahaï et al., 2019). Hence, establishing the perception of
human agency would be essential for screen mediated inves-
tigation of Social Agency.
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Crucially, the enhancement in Sense of Agency we expe-
rience from ‘we’ and shared agency appears to be something
we only experience when interacting with other humans.
When interacting with nonhuman agents (or robots), it has
been found that implicit Social Agency enhancements disap-
pear (Grynszpan et al., 2019; Obhi & Hall, 2011b; Sahaï et al.,
2019). Participants also judge their own contribution to joint
action as greater when interacting with a robot (Grynszpan
et al., 2019). Taken jointly, these findings may seem to sug-
gest that we do not recognize the agentic status of an artificial
other, but it is not that simple. Importantly, participants in
Grynszpan et al. (2019) were never aware that they were
interacting with a robot, always being told they had an unseen
human interaction partner. Therefore, the only change be-
tween human and robot conditions were subtle differences in
haptic feedback from the ‘other’ (Grynszpan et al., 2019).
Conversely, diminishing Social Agency effects from
interacting with robots mirror those found in human interac-
tion (e.g. interfered agency; Ciardo, Beyer, De Tommaso, &
Wykowska, 2020; Ciardo, De Tommaso, Beyer &
Wykowska, 2018). Taken together with Grynszpan et al.’
(2019) findings, it suggests Sense of Agency effects in
human–computer interaction are not always driven by the
agentic status of the other (i.e. top-down processes), but also
bottom-up sensory feedback or increased cognitive workload
(Ciardo et al., 2020; Ciardo et al., 2018).
Social Agency and eye gaze
Many social cues and responses are linked to the eyes and eye
movements are powerful social cues appropriate to use in the
methodology within Social Agency paradigms. This is be-
cause our eyes are arguably the foremost sensory organs that
both interpret and transmit information (Risko et al., 2016),
which makes them attuned to playing a key role in social
interactions. A key example of social cues employed in social
interactions are leading eye movements (i.e. ‘gaze cues’;
Friesen & Kingstone, 1998), which direct an observer to a
desired object, location, or person. Gaze cues hold mutually
beneficial social consequences for the performer and observer
alike: initiating joint attention (Frischen et al., 2007), and fa-
cilitating mental state attributions (Gobel et al., 2015, 2018;
Nummenmaa & Calder, 2009; Pfeiffer, Vogeley, &
Schilbach, 2013).
When conducting Social Agency eye-movement para-
digms (as in Pfeiffer et al., 2012; Stephenson et al., 2018),
there should also be consideration of the aforementioned fact
that in social contexts, gaze has dual function: perceiving and
signalling (Gobel et al., 2015). Critically, whether an individ-
ual’s eye movements are or are not signalling to another can
change gaze behaviour. Participants are less likely to look at
conspecifics (Kuhn, Teszka, Tenaw, & Kingstone, 2016;
Laidlaw, Foulsham, Kuhn, & Kingstone, 2011), or follow
gaze cues (Gallup, Chong, & Couzin, 2012) in real-world
interactions where the other can observe them, compared with
the same interactions in a screen-mediated laboratory setting,
where they know their eye movements cannot be observed.
This difference is pertinent to Social Agency as it has been
demonstrated that direct eye contact from a face stimulus on
screen can enhance Temporal Binding effects (Ulloa,
Vastano, George, & Brass, 2019). Eye contact is seen to in-
crease self-referential processing, eliciting increased self-
awareness (Baltazar et al., 2014) and therefore implicit agency
effects (Conty, George, & Hietanen, 2016). As this manipula-
tion was without human agency behind the face stimulus or
signalling of the participants gaze (Ulloa et al., 2019), it would
be of interest for future investigations to introduce these ele-
ments, which may improve ecological validity and enhance
agency effects even further.
Summary and conclusion
As the field of Social Agency is still in its infancy, this review
aimed to both synthesize current knowledge into a theoretical
concept and make recommendations for future research. First,
we argued that Social Agency must be regarded as distinct
from nonsocial Sense of Agency, and we identified three di-
mensions of Social Agency in terms of social effect (effect),
joint action (joint), and simply social presence (context).
Second, we argued that the current view of Social Agency is
oversimplified, which can account for the disparity of findings
in the field. Using an evidence-based approach, we built an
argument that Social Agency must be considered a continu-
um, centred on the degree of cooperation within an interaction
(visualized in Figure 2). This conceptualization leads to cate-
gorizing Social Agency into ‘we’, shared, vicarious, violated,
and interfered agency. This captures the range of evidence
available in the current literature, mainly centred on Social
Agency (joint) and (context).
By adopting this perspective, Social Agency research offers
exciting opportunity for development. A large proportion of the
existing research is centred on cooperative interaction between
two individuals with transient or novel association. This type of
interaction is widely evidenced to enhance Social Agency ef-
fects, modulated by the degree of cooperation, but this ad-
dresses only part of the continuum. Social Agency effects in
more general interactions where the action of the responding
agent is less predictable are critically underresearched.With the
work of Beyer et al. (2017; Beyer et al., 2018) demonstrating
that unpredictable interactions interfere with ones’ Social
Agency, it is important that this work is expanded on.
Individual and group competitive interactions are also contexts
which are ubiquitous in everyday life, but as yet how these
affect Social Agency is unknown. Table 2 highlights that many
experimental factors which are demonstrated to affect Sense of
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Agency in general are yet to be explored in relation to Social
Agency. These, along with ecological validity considerations
should also motivate future paradigms. Overall, this review
argues that whilst we still know very little about Social
Agency, with an adjustment of perspective, evidence from cur-
rent literature not only begins to form a more cohesive picture,
but leads the field to which empirical questions should be ad-
dressed next and identifies Social Agency (effect) as critically
under-researched.
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